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Eric Wolpin
Indians of various lineages and tribal memberships regularly par-
ticipate in the social structure of an individual Indian reservation. 1
Tribal authority to criminally prosecute nonmember Indians is there-
fore an important component of effective tribal self-governance. Be-
fore a tribe may assert jurisdiction over nonmember Indians accord-
ing to federal law, tribes must overcome one, and possibly two,
hurdles. First, the federal government must recognize tribal sover-
eignty to prosecute the charged individuals, and second, this recogni-
tion must not run afoul of constitutional equal protection and due
process limitations if these proscriptions apply. The first of these ob-
stacles to tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians was sur-
mounted when the Supreme Court, in United States v. Lara,2 affirmed
Congress's authority to recognize tribal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians. The Lara opinion has been a wellspring of law review arti-
cles and symposia. The second question, whether congressional rec-
ognition of tribal jurisdiction is constrained by equal protection
and/or due process, was recognized by the Lara majority,4 but was not
resolved in the Court's ruling.
" J.D. 2006, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 1999, Haverford College. I would
like to thank my former supervisors, Paul Spruhan of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court and
Matt Rappold of Dakota Plains Legal Services, who both patiently fielded many tribal and fed-
eral Indian law questions while performing their own busyjobs. I am also grateful to Professor
Struve for providing me, and all of Penn Law, with an Indian law class, and for giving detailed
feedback on this and other writings. And lastly, I would like to thank the Public Service Office
and Susan Feathers for generously providing funding for my law school education and summer
work, and for making the law school a better place.
I See infra notes 122-24 (describing intertribal events).
2 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
3 See, e.g., Symposium, United States v. BillyJo Lara: A Constitutional Crisis in Indian Law?,
28 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 269 (2004) (discussing the case two days after it was argued); Symposium:
Tiibal Sovereignty and United States v. Lara, 40 TULSA L. REv. 1 (2004) (exploring the decision).
4 See Lara, 541 U.S. at 209 ("[W]e need not, and we shall not, consider the merits of Lara's
due process claim. Other defendants in tribal proceedings remain free to raise that claim
should they wish to do so.").
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
In this comment, I examine two potential constitutional pitfalls
that may interfere with congressional recognition of tribal jurisdic-
tion over nonmember Indians that were not addressed by the Court
in Lara. First, does Congress's explicit inclusion of nonmember Indi-
ans and implicit exclusion of nonmember non-Indians from tribal ju-
risdiction violate equal protection requirements by creating jurisdic-
tion based on the Indian identity of the defendant? Second, does
legislation subjecting nonmember Indian defendants to prosecutorial
actions by tribal courts which do not provide the complete protec-
tions guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, specifically the right to counsel,
violate the due process rights of those defendants?
In this article, I address these questions by walking through the
legal strategy of a nonmember Indian seeking to invalidate his tribal
imprisonment in federal court following Lara. I demonstrate the
availability of federal court review for a nonmember Indian in tribal
jail, but consider the significant statutory and socio-economic barriers
that make such litigation more difficult. Looking at the content of
claims available to the hypothetical nonmember Indian, I first exam-
ine and discount a manner of statutory construction that would per-
mit federal judicial invalidation of tribal prosecutions that do not
provide a right to counsel. I follow with a discussion of relevant due
process and equal protection constitutional arguments, and demon-
strate why the Court has no persuasive constitutional hook upon
which it can invalidate Congress's decision to recognize tribal juris-
diction over nonmember Indians. Lastly, I explain why upholding
tribal jurisdiction and congressional intent serves the important in-
terest of advancing effective tribal government.
Before continuing, it should be noted why this discussion has
been restricted to nonmember Indians instead of member Indians or
nonmember non-Indians. This article does not examine the claims
of tribally prosecuted non-Indians because tribes lack jurisdiction
over this class of defendants;5 the detention of a non-Indian would be
invalidated in federal court for a lack ofjurisdiction before a statutory
or constitutional argument could arise. Member Indians are also dif-
ferently situated from nonmember Indians as their political-insider
status permits member Indians to be subjected to the enacted rules of
their tribe. As a result, member Indians do not have the same footing
to challenge a tribal conviction on federal due process grounds as
would a nonmember Indian. Notably, all individuals prosecuted by a
tribe, whether member or nonmember, have the standing to chal-
lenge detention upon federal statutory grounds and thus the statu-
5 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978) (explaining the lack of
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians without affirmative delegation by Congress).
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tory argument, although discussed in the context of a nonmember
Indian, would apply to members as well.
Nonmember Indians are differently situated because they are
within tribal jurisdiction but outside the tribal polity. The unusual
status of nonmember Indians provides them with a unique platform
to challenge the constitutionality of congressional Indian legislation
that defines the scope of tribal jurisdiction. Ultimately, these chal-
lenges should fail, as tribes should not be denied jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians in the light of the constitutionally permissible
and clearly articulated congressional intent to define tribal jurisdic-
tion in a manner intended to support tribal self-government.
I. RELEVANT HISTORY OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
All analysis of the frontiers and intersections of Indian powers of
self-determination and federal powers of regulation begins with Mar-
shall's famous trilogy of cases: Johnson v. McIntosh, Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,' and Worcester v. Georgia.8 In Cherokee Nation, Marshall labeled
tribes as "domestic dependant nations,"" and described the Indian-
federal relationship as one of "a ward to his guardian."0 The Court's
recognition of tribes as "domestic dependant nations" did not strip
the Indian tribes of their sovereignty, because, as Marshall noted, a
state does not "surrender its independence-its right to self govern-
ment, by associating with a stronger [state], and taking its protec-
tion."" The extent to which sovereignty was acceded to the United
States by tribes was limited by specific treaties between tribes and the
federal government.
In Worcester, Marshall established that it was the federal, and not
the state government, that had the power to develop relationships
with Indian nations.12 The exclusive federal role in regulating Indian
affairs originates in Article I of the Constitution, which grants Con-
gress the power "to regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes.' 3
The language of the Constitution established the federal government
as the solitary and definitive regulator of intergovernmental relations
with tribes. Although clearly placing the power of regulation in the
6 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
8 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
9 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
10 Id.
I) Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 560.
12 Id. at 520 ("[T]he regulation of [the relations between the United States and the Chero-
kee nation], according to the settled principles of our [C]onstitution, is committed exclusively
to the government of the union.").
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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lap of the federal government, this power was then viewed as re-
stricted-the reach of federal power was constrained by tribal sover-
eignty and the limitations of Congress's "commerce-based" regulatory
authority. 4
After the Marshall Trilogy, the Court defined a much broader
congressional power over internal tribal issues and ceased to require
a commerce-related justification for federal tribal interference. Al-
though the Supreme Court found little constitutional text to justify
enabling unfettered congressional authority over internal tribal mat-
ters unrelated to commerce,"' the Court upheld congressional legisla-
tion that regulated Indian criminal activities occurring within the
boundaries of Indian reservations. 7 Although cognizant of its weak
constitutional footing for permitting federal government intrusion
into tribal matter, the Court found that the "power of Congress to
organize territorial governments, and make laws for their inhabitants,
arises not so much from the clause in the Constitution," but instead
"from the ownership of the country in which the [t]erritories are, and
the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the National
Government, and can be found nowhere else.""' Although the Su-
preme Court has continued to recognize an expansive federal author-
ity to manage internal Indian affairs, 9 the Court has backed away
:4 See infra note 23.
See infra note 22.
16 In United States v. Kagama, the Court allowed the federal government to assume jurisdic-
Lion over crimes committed on reservations by and against Indians even though it would not fit
within the powers conferred by the Indian commerce clause. 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886)
("[I] t would be a very strained construction of this clause, that a system of criminal laws for In-
dians living peaceably in their reservations,.... without any reference to their relation to any
kind of commerce, was authorized by the grant of power to regulate commerce with the Indian
tribes.").
17 The Court stated:
The power of the [g]eneral [g]overnment over these remnants of a race once powerful,
now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the
safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that government, because it
never has existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within the geo-
graphical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it
alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes .... [This] is a valid law[].
Kaqama, 118 U.S. at 384-85.
Id. at 380.
19 The lack of a clear source of congressional power to so thoroughly regulate tribes troubles
Justice Thomas in his Lara dissent. The Court hangs its constitutionality hook on the Com-
merce Clause, the treaty-making power (which is an executive, not legislative power) and prior
case law, none of which seem to adequately account for the broad authority Congress has over
tribes. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 226 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The Court
should admit that it has failed in its quest to find a source of congressional power to adjust
tribal sovereignty."). The result is a naggingly inconsistent doctrine that permits the federal
government to "simultaneously claim power to regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes
through ordinary domestic legislation and also maintain that the tribes pos-
sess... 'sovereignty.'" Id. As neither the abrogation of federal authority to establish tribes as
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from relying upon the extra-constitutional "ownership right," and
now more heavily rests federal control upon the enumerated federal
treaty making power 20 and Indian commerce clause.2'
Congress has since utilized its plenary power over Indian affairs to
pass a wide assortment of laws that regulate on-reservation Indian
conduct. Congress has steeped in to take jurisdiction over Indian-on-
Indian reservation crimes, determined the minimum scope of rights
available to individuals facing prosecution by tribal governments
23
and established rules of adoption for Indian children.24 Although In-
dian country regulation is widespread, the legislation and judicial rul-
ings of greatest relation to this examination of Lara and the Duro-fix
are related to criminal jurisdiction in Indian, federal, and state
courts.
Congressional regulation 25 and Supreme Court action 26 have
sharply restricted tribal criminal jurisdiction while simultaneously ex-
panding the role of the federal judiciary to prosecute serious crimes
occurring in Indian Country.27 Although federal jurisdiction over
these crimes has not displaced tribal jurisdiction, tribes, in accor-
dance with federal statutory limitations, cannot sentence violators to
prison terms greater than one year, and are thus reliant on the fed-eral government for the prosecution of serious crimes.
true sovereigns, nor the assumption of complete federal control to eliminate tribal sovereignty
are likely to have significant support, Justice Thomas will have to accept that "the confusion that
[he has] identified will continue to haunt [Indian law] cases." Id.
20 Although it has been given little examination in this article, the treaty-making power has
been an important source of federal power. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (describing the
treaty-making powers).
21 See infra note 23.
22 Statute grants federal jurisdiction to prosecute the following offenses:
[M]urder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, as-
sault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in
serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an assault against an indi-
vidual who has not attained the age of 16 years, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony
under section 661 of this title within the Indian country[.]
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000).
23 See 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000) (outlining the protections available under the Indian Civil
Rights Act ("ICRA")).
24 See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000) (establishing rules particular to the adoption of children of
Indian ancestry pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act).
25 See infra note 33.
26 See infra notes 40-41 (discussing the failure to provide counsel to non-Indians challenging
their convictions in federal court).
27 See supra note 22 (describing the crimes that the federal judiciary has jurisdiction to prose-
cute in Indian Country).
28 See 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (setting sentencing limits at one year in prison under ICRA); ROBERT
N. CLINTON, CAROLE E. GOLDBERG & REBECCA TSOSIE, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATtvE NATIONS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 657-63 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing the exertion of concurrent jurisdic-
tion by tribes over crimes included in the Major Crimes Act).
Sept. 2006)
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As federal jurisdiction has expanded on the basis of the character
of the crime, tribal criminal jurisdiction has been constricted by the
identity of perpetrator.29 In United States v. Wheeler, the Supreme
Court recognized the power of a tribe to prosecute its members as an
undisturbed aspect of tribal sovereignty. In contrast, the Supreme
Court in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe held that the sovereignty
of tribes to prosecute non-Indians has not been similarly retained,
and tribes cannot prosecute non-Indians in tribal court. ' Oliphant
drew the dividing line for tribal criminal jurisdiction by placing Indi-
ans on one side and non-Indians on the other. In Duro v. Reina,12 the
Court re-drew the Oliphant jurisdiction line, moving from an In-
dian/non-Indian distinction to a tribal member/nonmember thresh-
old for criminal jurisdiction. The Duro Court held that the retained
sovereignty of tribes does not include the "the authority to impose
criminal sanctions against a citizen outside its own membership,
13
thus sweeping all nonmember Indians into a class outside of the
tribe's jurisdictional boundaries. Congress responded to this ruling
by passing the Duro-fix. The Duro-fix restored tribal authority to
prosecute non-member Indians. 4 The constitutionality of this legisla-
tion was decided by the Supreme Court a decade later in United States
v. Lara, where the Court was asked to evaluate the appropriateness
and meaning of this congressional recognition of tribal sovereignty.
29 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196-97 (1978) ("The effort by In-
dian tribal courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians... is a relatively new phe-
nomenon. And where the effort has been made in the past, it has been held that the jurisdic-
tion did not exist.").
M This case was raised in a double jeopardy context challenging the tribal action as a delega-
tion of federal authority and thus creating two convictions by the same sovereign. As in Lara,
the Court held that the tribes were acting as to their sovereignty and not federal authority. See
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978) ("[T]he power to punish offenses against
tribal law committed by Tribe members... has never been taken away from them.").
31 The Supreme Court held that tribes did not retain this jurisdiction even in the absence of
an explicit congressional action that established this limitation. The Court stated that Indian
powers are limited by congressional action and where those powers are "inconsistent with their
status." Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. at 208 (1978) (quoting Oliphant v.
Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (1976)). The Court relied, in part, on the "commonly shared pre-
sumption of Congress, the Executive Branch, and the lower federal courts that tribal courts do
not have the power" to show that exercising jurisdiction over non-Indians was inconsistent with
their status. Id. at 206. How this view can be said to be commonly shared among lower federal
courts is not entirely clear, as the Supreme Court had to reverse both lower court decisions,
finding this power within retained tribal sovereignty.
12 495 U.S. 679 (1990).
33 Id.
34 See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b)-(c), 104
Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (1991).
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In United States v. Lara,"5 the Court examined the validity of Con-
gress's decision to redefine the boundaries of tribal sovereignty in
opposition to the Supreme Court Duro ruling. The Court found that
Congress's action did not interfere with a constitutionally dictated
rule. The Court viewed its Duro decision as simply the Court's "view
of the tribes' retained sovereign status as of the timed' when there was
no direct legislation to define the boundaries of tribal jurisdiction. 6
The Court considers the existing legislative landscape in discerning
the scope of the "retained status." If Congress alters tribal jurisdic-
tion through legislation, the courts will reexamine the "retained
status" of tribes under the redefined landscape of tribal jurisdiction.
When Lara was before the Courts, unlike at the time of Duro, the leg-
islative backdrop specifically addressed the jurisdiction of tribes over
nonmember Indians. Congress's alteration of tribal jurisdiction
changed the status of the tribes and was within its power.
The Supreme Court further held that Congress's Duro-fix re-
flected a recognition of tribal power and was not a delegation of fed-
eral power.37 This seemingly semantic distinction means that the ac-
tion of the tribal government does not represent an act of the federal
government.38 Thus, a tribal prosecution followed or preceded by afederal prosecution does not create a valid double jeopardy defense.39
35 Lara made its way to the Supreme Court as a result of the following series of prosecutions:
Respondent BillyJo Lara is an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chip-
pewa Indians in north-central North Dakota. He married a member of a different tribe,
the Spirit Lake Tribe, and lived with his wife and children on the Spirit Lake Reserva-
tion, also located in North Dakota. After several incidents of serious misconduct, the
Spirit Lake Tribe issued an order excluding him from the reservation. Lara ignored the
order; federal officers stopped him; and he struck one of the arresting officers.
The Spirit Lake Tribe subsequently prosecuted Lara in the Spirit Lake Tribal Court for
"violence to a policeman." Lara pleaded guilty and, in respect to that crime, served 90
days injail.
After Lara's tribal conviction, the Federal Government charged Lara in the Federal
District Court for the District of North Dakota with the federal crime of assaulting a fed-
eral officer.
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196-97 (citations omitted).
36 Id. at 205 (emphasis in original).
37 See id. at 207 ("[W]e do not read any of these cases as holding that the Constitution for-
bids Congress to change 'judicially made' federal Indian law through this kind of legislation.").
38 See id. (clarifying that tribal governments act pursuant to federal statute and not as the
federal government itself).
39 The decision in Lara suggests that Congress also has the power to pass an Oliphant-fix to
provide for tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Senator Inouye of Hawaii introduced
a bill in the Senate, S. 578, the Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act
of 2002, to expand the retained tribal sovereignty and rectify the Oliphant decision. See Tribal
Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, S. 578, 108th Cong.
§ 13(b)(2)(A) (2002) ("The authority of an Indian tribal government... shall... extend
to... all places and persons within the Indian country (as defined in section 1151 of title 18,
United States Code) under the concurrent jurisdiction of the United States and the Indian
tribal government[.]). The bill did not pass.
Sept. 20061
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The Lara opinion addressed congressional authority to set the
boundaries of tribal sovereignty, but left unexplored the possibility
that enacting the Duro-fix, although not a delegation of federal power
to tribes, has other flaws, including violating either the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. Those issues have
yet to be adjudicated by the Supreme Court and are the focus of this
comment.
II. OBSTACLES TO PRESENTING A CLAIM
The failure of the prosecuting tribe to provide counsel presents
the due process hook by which a nonmember Indian can challenge
his tribal court conviction in federal court.0 The current landscape
of tribal courts provides fertile ground for such challenges as defen-
dants in a number of tribal courts are not guaranteed counsel in
criminal tribal proceedings.4'
Considering the current operation of tribal governments without
this guarantee, nonmember Indians are presently being convicted in
tribal court without the provision of counsel. Consequently, there
should be a pool of nonmember Indian defendants who can state a
due process claim founded on a failure to provide representation.
An equal protection argument should be more widely available, as all
convicted nonmember Indians can make an argument that they were
placed within tribal court jurisdiction based on racial identity.
A. Substantive and Procedural Obstacles
There are two preliminary questions that must be addressed by a
nonmember Indian interested in pursuing a federal claim to invali-
date a tribal sentence: what claims are available and in what manner
must they be raised to get review in federal court? First, the defen-
dant must recognize what substantive law governs the actions of tribal
authorities. The relationship of tribes to the Constitution and the
application of federal statutes to tribal actors creates a unique check
40 Examining the failure of tribes to provide counsel in tribal court as a possible violation of
the due process rights of the accused nonmember Indian is particularly resonant considering
the Supreme Court's acknowledgment of potential future due process claims founded on this
premise. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 209 (refraining from addressing Laa's due process claim but ac-
knowledging the opportunity for others to bring similar claims).
41 The exact number and percentage of tribes that do not provide representation is unclear.
Compare United States v. Red Bird, 146 F. Supp. 2d 993, 997 (D.S.D. 2001) (noting that "[m]ost
tribes within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota,
Central and Northern Divisions, do not provide this right [to a court appointed attorney]"),
with Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribe Laws Codified, § 1-2-401(2) (2000) ("An indigent
defendant accused of a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment has a right to representa-
tion by the Tribal Defender's Office.").
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on tribal prosecuting entities, one far different than those that limit
federal or state governments. Second, the individuals must identify
the proper way to challenge a tribal court ruling in federal court. As
such litigation avenues have been sharply limited by Congress and
the courts, obtaining federal review for this defendant may be differ-
ent than for a defendant convicted in state or federal court.
Beginning first with content, a defendant seeking federal review
of a tribal court conviction for a possible violation of due process
rights cannot directly state a claim based on a tribal court's violation
of his constitutionally protected rights. The Constitution was written
to limit and define the scope of federal authority. The source of
power for tribes, as nations with roots that predate the Constitution,
originates and exists independent of federal and constitutional au-
thority. Because actions of tribal governments do not derive from a
federal source, those actions are not directly defined or limited by the
constitutional provisions that limit federal powers.42 Although most
of the limitations of the Bill of Rights have been extended to control
state action, these rights have never been similarly incorporated to
limit the actions of tribal governments. 3 Consequently, a defendant
convicted in tribal court cannot assert a due process claim against
tribes on strictly constitutional grounds because tribes are bound by
tribal law, targeted federal statutory restrictions, and federal common
law, but not the Bill of Rights and the remainder of the Constitution.
42 In Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) the Supreme Court recognized that because
local tribal powers predate, and do not originate from the Constitution, tribal governments are
not operated on by the Constitution. In Talton, the Court found that Cherokee Nation, in pur-
suing criminal convictions, were not required to fulfill the Fifth Amendment's requirement of
indictment by grand jury. Talton, 163 U.S. at 376. Courts in a number of subsequent cases have
held that other provisions of the Constitution are inapplicable to tribes. See, e.g., Martinez v.
Southern Ute Tribe of the Southern Ute Reservation, 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957) (holding
that tribal actions are not restricted by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 960 (1958); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe,
370 F.2d 529, 533 (8th Cir. 1967) (holding tribal actions are not restricted by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Notably, holding tribal authorities outside Constitu-
tional limitations does not abrogate congressional supremacy over tribes. According to the
Court, tribes are still subject to "the supreme legislative authority of the United States." Talton,
163 U.S. at 384.
43 The Bill of Rights was originally interpreted to limit the actions of the federal government
and not state governments. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833) ("[IT]he [Flifth
[A]mendment must be understood as restraining the power of the general government, not as
applicable to the states."). The Court has since extended the reach of much but not all of the
Bill of Rights to touch state action using the "no state shall" language of the Fourteenth
Amendment to incorporate certain provisions of the Bill of Rights to states. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV § 1; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 478-86
(2d ed. 2002) (detailing the evolution of incorporation). The same reasoning cannot be used
to incorporate the Bill of Rights to tribes as there is no parallel "no tribe shall" language ex-
pressed in the Fourteenth Amendment that could be interpreted to extend the Bill of Rights to
limit tribal government actions. The result is that tribal governments, unlike state governments,
remain outside all of the provisions the Bill of Rights.
Sept. 2006]
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Congress, aware of the inapplicability of the Bill of Rights to tribal
governments, and the absence of federally mandated civil rights pro-
tections available to defendants in tribal court, enacted the Indian
Civil Rights Act ("ICRA") to limit the powers of tribal governments.
44
The ICRA was passed by Congress with the dual intent of preventing
tribal interference with individual civil rights and preserving tribal
capacity to self-govern. To fulfill this second aim of furthering tribal
self-determination, ICRA was drafted to provide limited federal re-
view of tribal court violations of the ICRA. The statute only permits
federal review of tribal court action through federal habeas corpus
review. The Supreme Court has upheld congressional intent to pro-
vide only a minimally intrusive mechanism for enforcing the ICRA,
and has refused to read implicit authorizations of civil actions or ac-
tions for declaratory or injunctive relief into the ICRA.47 As a result,
defendants seeking federal review of potential violations of the ICRA
by tribal judiciaries may pursue a federal claim solely through habeas
review.
4 The ICRA is an inexact restatement of the Bill of Rights intentionally modified by Con-
gress to exclude certain provisions, including the First Amendment prohibition on establish-
ment of religion and the Fifth Amendment requirement of initiating criminal actions by jury
indictment, that were deemed less appropriate in the tribal context. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03
(2000) (refraining from providing any clause preventing the establishment of religion or re-
quiring indictment by a grand jury); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978)
("[R]ather than providing in wholesale fashion for the extension of constitutional requirements
to tribal governments, as had been initially proposed, [Congress] selectively incorporated and
in some instances modified the safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit the unique political, cul-
tural, and economic needs of tribal governments.") (footnote omitted).
See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62 (describing the "two distinct and competing pur-
poses.., manifest in the provisions of the ICRA").
46 See 25 U.S.C. § 1303 ("The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any
person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian
tribe.").
47 See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 72 ("[W]e are constrained to find that § 1302 does not impliedly
authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief against either the tribe or its officers.").
48 Federal courts are not the only venue that can review tribal trial court proceedings. Many
tribes have appellate level courts with jurisdiction to examine the propriety of convictions in the
context of the tribal laws and tribal constitutional provisions that safeguard civil rights or the
ICRA. In forming appellate courts, tribes have either joined forces to develop intertribal appel-
late courts or have simply established discrete tribal appellate courts. Compare Frank Pommer-
sheim, Looking Forward and Looking Back: The Promise and Potential of a Sioux Nation Judicial Sup-
port Center and Sioux Nation Supreme Court, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 269, 291 (2002) (describing the
Northern Plains Intertribal Court which "sits in panels with one judge from each participating
tribe"), with Oglala Sioux Tribe: Law and Order Code Ch.1 § 6.0, available at http://
www.ntjrc.org/ccfolder/oglalalawandorderl.htm ("There is hereby created the Supreme
Court of the Oglala Sioux Nation.").
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B. Habeas Obstacles
1. Exhaustion
A petitioner requesting federal habeas review of a state court pro-
ceeding must exhaust all available effective state remedies before
federal courts can exercise habeas review."' Federal courts require
similar exhaustion of tribal court remedies when the petitioner is a
member of the prosecuting tribe.50  Nonmembers, unlike members,
however, may not be required to exhaust all remedies available in the
tribal appellate system-courts have differed as to application of this
rule to nonmembers." If nonmember Indians are exempted from
the exhaustion requirement, federal habeas review of the trial would
be swifter and conserve resources and time. An application of the
exhaustion requirement to nonmember Indians would delay jurisdic-
tion for a federal habeas claim and require the input of additional re-
sources at the tribal court level.
2. In Custody Requirement of Habeas Review
Habeas review is available in a lesser number of cases than other
forms of appellate review because habeas review is limited to cases
where the petitioner is "in custody., 52 Tribal civil and criminal cases
where the defendant is no longer "in custody" do not qualify for ha-
beas review, and cannot be challenged under the ICRA. Tribal
courts, in accordance with limitations set by Congress in ICRA, can
impose prison sentences of no longer than one year. 5 The short du-
ration of sentences in tribal jail provides a potential stumbling block
to fulfilling the "in custody" prerequisite of habeas review. The peti-
49 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1) (A) (2000) ("An application for a writ of habeas corpus on be-
half of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless
it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.").
See Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 826 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[A tribal member] is bound to fol-
low the procedures of the tribe if they are consistent with the Indian Civil Rights Act. Having
failed to do so, she is not entitled to have her petition for habeas relief considered.").
51 Courts have disagreed as to whether nonmembers must exhaust all remedies before seek-
ing federal habeas review. Compare id. (inferring from Duro that "when a tribal court attempts to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over a person not a member of a tribe, no requirement of exhaus-
tion need be enforced"), with Lyda v. Tah-Bone, 962 F. Supp 1434, 1435 (D. Utah 1997) (dis-
agreeing with conclusion in Westit that does not require exhaustion of remedies for nonmem-
bers).
52 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b)(c)(3) (2000) ("The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
prisoner unless... [hle is in custody").
53 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) ("No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government
shall ... impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment greater than im-
prisonment for a term of one year").
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tioner must file his petition for habeas review before federal courts
cease to have jurisdiction, and before the case becomes moot.54
Considering the short time frame of imprisonment, the exhaus-
tion requirement, and the sometimes sluggardly progression of a case
through the judicial system, a petitioner may be unable to get a ha-
beas petition heard in federal court before the maximum one year
sentence is served. The "in custody" requirement, therefore, might
present a serious obstacle to mounting a habeas challenge in federal
court. Fortunately for the challenger, a petition filed before the com-
pletion of a sentence provides the reviewing federal court with juris-
diction even if the individual is released prior to the hearing.5" An
individual seeking to press a challenge through habeas review must
therefore ensure that the petition is filed before the completion of
the sentence.
A released petitioner that has filed for habeas during his incar-
ceration must also overcome a possible mootness defect. 6 A moot-
ness challenge in cases where the individual's incarceration has since
completed may be overcome by a showing of lingering collateral con-
sequences of detention. 57 A mootness defect resulting from the brev-
ity of the tribal incarceration could also fall under the "capable of
The "in custody" requirement has been more broadly interpreted to include punishments
other than imprisonment: "[B]esides physical imprisonment, there are other restraints on a
man's liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been thought sufficient
in the English-speaking world to support the issuance of habeas corpus." Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963) (holding that the conditions of parole can be sufficient to qualify as in
custody and trigger habeas review). This broad reading of the "in custody" provision for federal
review of state trials may make it easier for a defendant to pursue similar federal reviews of
tribal actions. There are tribally incarcerated individuals who would indisputably meet the "in
custody" requirement, and possibly other non-imprisoned individuals facing other qualifying
limitations of their liberty.
5 See Carafas v. Lavallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1968) (holding that release from a state cor-
rectional facility does not destroy federal habeas jurisdiction); Salem v. Arm Springs Tribal Corr.
Facility, 134 F.3d 948, 953 (9th Cir. 1998) (hearing a habeas petition where the claim was made
while the petitioner was serving a sentence handed down in tribal court but had since been re-
leased).
See Reyes-Sanchez v. Ashcroft, 261 F. Supp. 2d 276, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("When a habeas
petitioner has been released from custody after filing a petition, the relevant inquiry is:
'whether petitioner's subsequent release caused the petition to be moot because it no longer
presented a case or controversy under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution'" (quoting Spencer v.
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998))).
57 Collateral consequences of imprisonment keeps the controversy live. See Carafas v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. at 237 (stating that where there are "'disabilities or burdens [which] may
flow from' petitioner's conviction, he has 'a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction
which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him.'" (quoting Fiswick v. United
States, 329 U.S. 211, 222 (1946))); Reyes-Sanchez, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 284 ("A petition is not moot
if the petitioner suffers from any 'concrete and continuing injury' that is a collateral conse-
quence of the detention and if the injury can be remedied if the petitioner prevails in his quest
for a writ of habeas corpus.").
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repetition and evading review" exception to mootness. s With the
availability of mootness exceptions, and continued federal jurisdic-
tion after the completion of a prison sentence, a nonmember Indian
petitioner should be able to have a violation of the ICRA heard be-
fore a federal court on habeas review in spite of the short timeframe
of tribal incarceration.
C. Extra-legal Obstacles
Congressional limitations of federal remedies for ICRA violations
are not the only bottleneck restricting a nonmember Indian's ICRA
claim; a petitioner would likely face numerous logistical difficulties
finding representation to assist in filing a habeas claim. A claim
founded upon a failure to provide representation in tribal court
would have to be brought by an imprisoned indigent individual who
was not offered counsel at trial. As a number of tribes provide coun-
sel in accordance with tribal law, the pool of petitioners is limited to
59
individuals sentenced by tribal authorities lacking this protection.
Such a petitioner would not have prior counsel to assist in recogniz-
ing the availability of federal habeas review. He would thus need to
either identify and file the habeas petition pro se, or search for coun-
sel from tribal prison-a difficult task considering the short time
frame of detention and the distance of many reservations from large
communities of legal practitioners. As a qualifying petitioner would
likely be financially constrained by the same conditions that pre-
vented him from retaining representation at his initial tribal court
trial, he would require a lawyer or organization willing to take the
case without a significant fee.
The incarcerated individual is further restricted in retaining a
lawyer as he would be ineligible for representation by a federally-
funded legal services organization. Legal services organizations pro-
vide much of the no-cost representation for indigent persons needing
representation in tribal court.60 Under federal rules, legal services
58 The "capable of repetition, but evading review" exception is applicable where the chal-
lenged action is of a duration too short to be resolved before the condition expires, and the
action is likely to be repeated against the same individual. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17
(1998) (stating the requirements for meeting the evading review exception). The intent of this
exception is to prevent violations of rights in cases with shorter sentences from sitting perpetu-
ally beyond the reach of appellate review. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 52-53 (1968)
("We do not believe that the Constitution contemplates that people deprived of constitutional
rights at this [minor offences] level should be left utterly remediless and defenseless against
repetitions of unconstitutional conduct."). The short duration of detention in tribal jails fits
these sentences squarely within this policy justification for this exception.
59 See cases cited supra note 41.
Legal services organizations have a broader reach on reservations than they do in other
locations. Unlike in federal and state courts, where legal services is typically unable to represent
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organizations accepting federal Legal Services Corporation funding
may not bring habeas claims on behalf of otherwise qualifyring cli-
ents.6' Because of the federal restrictions on legal service providers,
indigent individuals seeking to bring a habeas challenge to their
tribal detention are prevented from retaining the primary provider of
no-fee legal services available to indigent individuals on reservations.
A petitioner desiring a lawyer must instead seek private pro bono
counsel or find a non-profit organization unencumbered by federal
legal services funding restrictions.
The nature of the claim would make the search for a lawyer even
more difficult. The types of non-profit organizations that often focus
on Indian and tribal issues would likely be uninterested in this habeas
claim because it seeks to increase federal control and oversight over
tribal authorities; organizations that utilize legal challenges to
strengthen tribal sovereignty and self-determination would likely find
this case antithetical to their ideology.62 That a habeas claim would
challenge tribal sovereignty, and not federal or state actions, would
likely limit the number of non-profit organizations (with the capacity
to provide representation) that would sign on to provide such repre-
sentation. Considering the limited availability of interested non-
profit legal organizations, a petitioner would most likely have to rely
on private pro bono representation. The logistical difficulties, pri-
marily incarceration and geographic isolation, make the retention of
clients in a criminal proceeding, misdemeanors and lesser offenses tried in tribal courts are ex-
plicitly exempted from the definition of "criminal proceeding" and thus fall within the cases
available to legal services organizations operating in tribal court. See 45 C.F.R. § 1613.2 (2005)
("A misdemeanor or lesser offense tried in an Indian tribal court is not a 'criminal proceed-
ing."'). On reservations where many residents qualify financially for legal services, such organi-
zations may provide the bulk of individual representation in tribal court, See Dakota Plains Le-
gal Services, http://web.archive.org/web/20041009203840/www.dpls.org/history.html (last
visited Aug. 18, 2006) (representing clients on or near nine reservations in North and South
Dakota, which "is often the sole source of legal assistance available to our clients.").
61 See 45 C.F.R. § 1615.1 (2005) ("This part prohibits the provision of legal assistance in an
action in the nature of habeas corpus .. ").
62 See, e.g., Native American Rights Fund, http://www.narf.org/about/about whatwedo_
mission.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2006) (declaring the Native American Rights Fund (NARF)
mission: "The future existence of the remaining Indian tribes in this country depends ulti-
mately upon ... the rights of self-determination necessary to preserve traditional customs and
ways of life.").
There are organizations that would, ideologically, line up behind a habeas petition. See
Citizens Equal Rights Alliance, http://www.citizensalliance.org (last visited Apr. 11, 2006) (stat-
ing the Citizens Equal Rights Foundation's ("CERF") support for greater federal control over
tribal lands and government). CERF and similar organizations may support a habeas claim in
this type of case, but it is not clear that they have or would provide direct representation. See
Brief for Citizens Equal Rights Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent in Part,
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (No. 03-107), 2003 WL 22988876 (displaying CERF's
capacity to develop an amicus curiae brief, but not necessarily direct representation).
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private representation, likely an individual's only option for counsel,
a difficult task.
There is probably a limited pool of lawyers interested in taking a
challenge to a tribal court ruling against a nonmember Indian. An
individual might be able to secure private pro bono representation,
but would likely have to start the action pro se. The obstacles to se-
curing counsel do not mean this claim will never surface, but it does
make such a challenge more difficult to bring and less likely to re-
ceive federal review.
III. DUE PROCESS: A STATUTORY INTERPRETATION APPROACH
Once a nonmember Indian has secured representation or ven-
tured into the legal process pro se, he should make an initial statu-
tory argument that the ICRA must be read to provide a right to coun-
sel under its statutory due process clause. This argument swims
against the tide of Court dicta, but provides a statutory resolution that
allows the court to avoid settling more difficult constitutional issues.
The statutory argument would require a new reading of the ICRA,
and would likely prevail only if the Court wishes to avoid addressing
the possible underlying constitutional problems alluded to in Lara.
64
The Unites States Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amend-
ment requires an accused individual be furnished with counsel in
state and federal court where imprisonment is a consequence of
prosecution. The Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
counsel in ensuring fair process and outcome, noting that it is an
"obvious truth" that "in our adversary system of criminal justice, any
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."66 Recognizing
the "obvious" value of representation to ensuring a fair trial, the
Court has deemed the guarantee of counsel "a fundamental right, es-
sential to a fair trial.' 67 By recognizing the provision of counsel as a
fundamental right, the Court has made this requirement applicable
to state prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment.
6
Even those rights found fundamental by the Supreme Court can-
not be applied to Indian tribes as the Fourteenth Amendment does
64 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing the Lara question).
65 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (holding that counsel must be
provided to assure a fair criminal trial). See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (Gideon
and Argersinger).
C6 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
67 Id. at 340.
CA See id. at 344-45.
Sept. 2006] 1085
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
not incorporate rights against tribal governments. 69 As discussed
above, an individual seeking to assert a violation of individual rights
by tribal actors must typically pursue that claim as a violation of rights
provided by the ICRA (in the form of a habeas petition) and not as a
claim of a violation of constitutional rights. The ICRA provides a
number of protections that mirror those found in the Bill of Rights.70
The two provisions most relevant to this analysis are the requirement
that "[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government
shall.., deny... any person of liberty or property without due proc-
ess of law" nor "deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the
right ... at his own expense to have assistance of counsel for his de-
fense., 7' Because the ICRA is a statute and not a constitutional provi-
sion, an examination of the meaning of its provisions utilizes tools of
statutory interpretation, not constitutional analysis. The question
that follows is whether a right to counsel can be found to inhabit the
rights guaranteed by the ICRA to individuals facing tribal prosecu-
tion.
The ICRA establishes a right to counsel that cannot be trumped
by tribal authority, but limits the right to counsel to lawyers that can
be obtained at the individual's own expense. The canon of statutory
interpretation dictating a judiciary should "construe the language of
an enactment so as to give it the effect Congress intended, suggests
that this explicit textual limitation should be upheld by the courts.
The Ninth Circuit, in Tom v. Sutton, found that the counsel require-
ment in the ICRA was not coextensive with the right to counsel provi-
sion of the Bill of Rights. The Ninth Circuit refers to Congress's deci-
sion to fashion a distinct Indian statute instead of creating a
wholesale importation of the Bill of Rights into Indian tribal prosecu-
tions. The Ninth Circuit suggests this selectivity demonstrates con-
gressional intent to apply only enumerated provisions of the Bill of
Rights to tribes, and reinforces an interpretation that the ICRA con-
tains only a limited right to paid counsel. 3 In addition, statements
69 See Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 241-242 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the right to
counsel under the Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian tribes); Glover v. United States, 219 F.
Supp. 19, 21 (D. Mont. 1963) ("[T]he provisions of the Federal Constitution guaranteeing due
process and the right to counsel do not apply in prosecutions in tribal courts.").
70 See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (precluding tribes from requiring compelling self-incrimination, try-
ing an individual for the same crime twice, issuing a warrant without probable cause, perform-
ing unreasonable searches and seizures, etc.).
71 Id.
72 Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 1976).
73 The Ninth Circuit cited the following legislative history:
In 1965, Senator Ervin introduced a bill which would have restricted the Indian tribes, in
exercising their powers of local self-government, to the same extent as imposed on the
United States government by the United States Constitution.... As a result of the objec-
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made prior to the enactment of the ICRA indicate Congress may not
have intended to provide a right to counsel for the indigent in order
to avoid overextending protections beyond the human and financial
resources available to tribes."4
Interpreting this single passage of the ICRA in isolation, however,
neglects to consider the possible impact of the due process require-
ment applied to tribes through the ICRA.7" The ICRA includes a tex-
tual commitment to the protection of individuals from denial of life,
liberty, or property without "due process of law" by tribal govern-
ments. 76 The exact textual replication of the constitutional due proc-
ess requirement 77 in the ICRA suggests the possibility that the two
concepts, constitutional due process and tribal due process, should
be similarly construed by the courts.
When the ICRA was adopted in 1968,78 the right to counsel, as de-
fined by the Supreme Court, required state and federal governments
to provide representation to indigent defendants in all felony trials.79
It was not until 1972, four years after the enactment of the ICRA, that
the Supreme Court, under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
tions to Senator Ervin's bill, the Department of the Interior submitted a substitute bill
which guaranteed only specific enumerated rights to the Indians.
Id.
74 See id. at 1104. The Solicitor for the Department of the Interior, Mr. Frank Barry, testified
before the subcommittee, in part, as follows:
[I]n order to eliminate the possibility that the courts might hold in those cases in which
Indian tribal courts have jurisdiction that the courts will be required to provide counsel
in the case of indigent defendants, we have specified that the assistance of counsel will be
provided at the expense of the Indian defendant. There are several reasons for this.
One is that there are no attorneys on the reservations, neither prosecuting attorneys nor
defense attorneys, and there would be no bar over which the court has jurisdiction from
which it could select attorneys and over which it would have authority to say to an attor-
ney, 'You must represent this litigant.' Accordingly, until a situation obtains where law-
yers would be available, we think that it should not be required that the Indian tribes
provide defense counsel.
Id. (quoting Hearings on S.961, S.962, S.963, S.964, S.966, S.967, S.978, S.J.Res.40, To Protect the
Constitutional Rights of American Indians Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Committee, 89th Cong. 21 (1965)).
75 See 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
76 Id.
77 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
78 Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (prior to 1986 amendment).
79 By that time, the court had moved the situational threshold for requiring counsel from
capital cases with special circumstances in Powell, to non-capital cases with special circumstances
in Betts, and to all felony trials in Gideon. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)
("[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.") (emphasis
added); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471-72 (1942) ("Every court has power, if it deems proper,
to appoint counsel where that course seems to be required in the interest of fairness."); Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) ("[1]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ
counsel.... it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a
necessary requisite of due process of law. .. .") (emphasis added).
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Clause, mandated state provision of representation to defendants
charged with misdemeanor crimes.80
The ICRA, as first enacted, limited tribal judiciaries to imposing
terms of no longer than six months in jail.8' By restricting the scope
of tribal sentences, Congress essentially limited tribal jurisdictions to
imposing only misdemeanor-type penalties. At the time of its draft-
ing, the sentences Congress made available to tribes under the ICRA
were not of the type that would trigger a right to counsel under the
constitutional Due Process Clause in federal and state court. 2 Con-
sidering the fact that the Supreme Court had yet to recognize the ne-
cessity of counsel in misdemeanor cases to fulfill constitutional Due
Process Clause requirements, it is not surprising that Congress was
willing to skip the explicit requirement of counsel for indigent per-
sons facing trial in tribal court.
The absence of this enumerated requirement, however, which at
the time was not considered constitutionally problematic in federal
and state court, may not mean that a requirement that all defendants
be provided with counsel could not originate in the ICRA. The ICRA
provides more than an itemized, explicitly defined set of protections;
Congress included within it a vague due process requirement for the
protection of individual rights with no explicit or implicit roadmap as
to its scope or meaning. Might the due process clause in the ICRA
have been intended by Congress to follow a parallel evolution as the
Due Process Clause in the Constitution? As the constitutional Due
Process Clause has since evolved to mandate the provision of counsel
in misdemeanor trials, might tribal due process have been intended
to follow a corresponding path that requires this same protection in
tribal court? If Congress intended the "due process" of the ICRA to
mirror the "Due Process" Clause of the Constitution, then the ICRA
may define a right to counsel for the indigent defendant even where
the explicit right to counsel provision in the statute is not so broad.
Judicial interpretation, however, has suggested that the two due
processes may not be identical. The Supreme Court has noted that
the ICRA was intended to "fit the unique political, cultural, and eco-
80 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that "no person may be im-
prisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony unless he was rep-
resented by counsel at his trial").
81 The ICRA has since been amended to increase the maximum duration of a tribal sen-
tence to one year. See Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (substituting "for a term
of one year and a fine of $5,000" for "for a term of six months or a fine of $500").
82 This was in the time period between Gideon and Argersinger, where counsel was required
for telony charges but not for misdemeanors. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40 (holding that coun-
sel must be provided in misdemeanors where the possible penalty includes imprisonment);
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45 (holding that counsel must be provided in felony trials).
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nomic needs of tribal governments."" For example, circuit courts
have found the equal protection clause in the ICRA is different from
the constitutional clause of the same name because congressional in-
tent was to create an Indian equal protection clause of a different
84
scope than the Equal Protection Clause found in the Constitution.
Because the ICRA was tailored to match the culture of tribal govern-
ments, courts can determine that the two due process clauses do not
have a single meaning.
85
The meaning of due process in the ICRA has not been as well-
defined in federal court as its constitutional homolog. Even though
the boundaries of ICRA due process are poorly mapped, the Court's
willingness to individualize the ICRA to each tribal entity suggests the
Court is unlikely to simply transpose federal due process require-
ments upon the ICRA due process clause.86 Argersingers creation of
new federal and state constitutional due process protections likely will
not dictate the meaning of tribal due process protections. It seems
unlikely that an attempt to interpret the ICRA as providing a right to
counsel for the indigent can overcome the ICRA's counsel provision,
legislative history, and unique due process clause.
IV. A CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH
Instead of approaching this question by seeking shelter within a
particular statutory interpretation of the ICRA, a nonmember Indian
habeas petitioner may find an alternative argument in an attack on
the constitutionality of the ICRA's applicability to nonmember Indi-
ans. Congress amended the ICRA (the aforementioned Duro-fix) to
recognize tribal jurisdiction over all Indians. In Lara, the Supreme
Court held that in this amendment Congress had not delegated fed-
eral authority to Indian tribes, but simply recognized the bounds of
83 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62-63 (1978) ("[The ICRA] selectively
incorporated and in some instances modified the safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit the
unique political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments.").
84 See Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 682 (10th Cir. 1971) ("Congress intended.., in
some respects the equal protection requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment should not be
embraced in the Indian Bill of Rights.").
85 Indeed, if this is the intent of the ICRA, the expected definition of the ICRA due process
clause may have as many meanings as there are recognized tribes. Each tribe, based on its po-
litical, cultural, and economic needs, may have a unique community definition of the scope of
due process. If so, individual Indian tribes, and not the federal government, are likely the most
knowledgeable entity to define the local meaning of due process. However, under habeas re-
view, the federal judiciary does have review power, as in a dispute over the right to counsel, and
thus is asked to make this determination. See David Williams, Legitimation and Statutoiy Interpreta-
tion: Conquest, Consent, and Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REv. 403, 497 (1994)
("[T]ribal courts could tailor the ICRA to reflect their own tribal context and values without
persistent outside judicial influence.").
86 See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62 (describing an instance of this type of reasoning).
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inherent tribal sovereignty held by tribes."7 As a result of this distinc-
tion as to the source of tribal power, prosecutions by the federal and
tribal governments originate from two different sovereign authorities,
the tribe and the federal government, and not just from two heads of
the same federal governmental body.88 The resolution of the recogni-
tion versus delegation debate in Lara means legislation that changes
the boundaries of tribal authority cannot be analogized to typical af-
firmative (delegating) federal legislation creating administrative and
federal courts.
Even though the ICRA recognizes tribal sovereignty rather than
delegating federal authority, the ICRA was established in accordance
with Congress's constitutionally granted plenary power. Lara decided
that Congress, under its constitutionally provided plenary power, has
the authority to pass statutes that "lift the restrictions on the tribes'
criminal jurisdiction," but did not decide whether the content of
those statutes must be scrutinized for violations of non-plenary power
constitutional protections.90 If the Duro-fix is analyzed not for the ex-
istence of constitutional authority as in Lara, but for its violation of
constitutional limitations, then there are two possible arguments to
be made: first, Congress has violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution by recognizing tribal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians but not nonmember non-Indians; and second, that subject-
ing those facing tribal court prosecutions to incomplete liberty pro-
tections is a violation of their due process rights.
A. Equal Protection
Congress relied upon its plenary power-a power rooted in the
Indian commerce clause and the responsibilities of the trust relation-
ship-as the source of its legislative authority for the Duro-fix.91 Typi-
cally, when Congress regulates according to its authority in one por-
tion of the Constitution it is constrained by the limitations found in
other constitutional provisions. For example, when Congress legis-
lates under the Interstate Commerce Clause, such legislation is con-
87 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199 (2004).
88 As a result of this distinction, Lara's two trials do not present a double jeopardy problem
as the authority for prosecution did not originate in the same sovereign.
89 For example, the authority for an administrative body hearing originates from the federal
constitutional powers. An administrative body is acting as the federal government and not as a
separate sovereign.
90 Lara, 541 U.S. at 200 ("Several considerations lead us to the conclusion that Congress
does possess the constitutional power to lift the restrictions on the tribes' criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians as the statute seeks to do.").
91 See id. at 202 ("Congress, with this Court's approval, has interpreted the Constitution's
'plenary' grants of power as authorizing it to enact legislation that both restricts and, in turn,
relaxes those restrictions on tribal sovereign authority.").
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strained by the Equal Protection Clause as applied to the federal gov-
ernment through the Fifth Amendment.92 An obvious analogy be-
tween the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian commerce
clause beckons, and at least upon initial glance, it seems that if the
Equal Protection Clause constrains congressional action under one
Commerce Clause (interstate) it should also constrain congressional
action under another commerce clause (Indian). However, this
analogy turns out to be overly simplistic, and commentators have per-
suasively argued both for and against the application of the equal
protection constraint to legislative action undertaken in accordance
with the Indian commerce clause.93
Scholars' preferences, however, do not decide law, and the Court
has reached its own conclusion as to the judicial scrutiny that should
apply to Indian legislation. The Court has noted it has not been "de-
terred ... from scrutinizing Indian legislation to determine whether
it violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amend-
ment.''94 In Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court analyzed the appli-
cability of the Equal Protection Clause in the context of a statute that
gave employment preferences to Indians seeking a position with the
Bureau of Indian Affairs. In examining this legislation as a potential
violation of equal protection requirements, the Court avoided trig-
gering a race-based strict scrutiny standard (which would likely have
sunk the preference) by viewing Indians, at least in this context, as a
92 See David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA
L. REv. 759, 780 (1991) ("[C]ongress must regulate interstate commerce consistently with the
equal protection element of the [F]ifth [A]mendment.. ").
93 Compare Williams, supra note 92, at 780 ("[E]ven if [AIrticle I gives Congress unlimited
power over Indians, the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause may effectively take away that power by
forbidding Congress to single out Indians for special treatment."), with Carole E. Goldberg, In-
dividual Rights and Tribal Revitalization, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 889 (2003). Williams suggests that the
Equal Protection and Indian commerce clause sections are "in tension with each one another
and cannot be easily reconciled." Williams, supra note 92, at 784. Relying upon canons of in-
terpretation that favor newer over older, Williams asserts that the newer equal protection re-
quirement-a reflection of more current distaste for unequal treatment-should take prece-
dence over the Indian commerce clause which relies upon an outdated ambivalence toward
unequal treatment. Id. at 784-85. Goldberg and Robert Clinton argue that actions under the
Indian commerce clause are not constrained by the Fourteenth Amendment. Clinton notes
that the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly singles out Indians for special treatment, an indica-
tion that the drafters did not express an intent to apply equal protection for Indians. See Robert
N. Clinton, Isolated in the Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and
Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REv. 979, 1011-12 n.201 (1981) ("[S]uggesting ... the 14th Amend-
ment was not intended to change the relationship between the tribes and the federal govern-
ment."). The Fourteenth Amendment therefore can be read as not intending to alter the exist-
ing federal-tribal relationship. See id. In addition, Goldberg asserts that the Indian commerce
clause and the Fourteenth Amendment "affirm the governmental status of Indian nations and
their existence outside the formation of the United States." See Goldberg, supra, at 934-35.
94 Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73,84 (1977).
95 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
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political and not a racial group. By defining Indians as a political
group, a characterization that does not create a suspect class, the
Court is not beholden to an examination of the legislation according
to the more searching strict scrutiny standard: One would expect
that, in light of the lack of a suspect classification, the Court would
settle on the less demanding rational basis test. However, the Court
suggested that it would apply a stricter rule that would permit legisla-
tive "special treatment [towards Indians that] can be tied rationally to
the fulfillment of Congress's unique obligation toward the Indians." s
Subsequent decisions suggest that the Supreme Court may be exam-
ining the legislation in light of the trust relationship, or they may be
simply settling upon the more common unfettered rational basis re-
view for Indian legislation.99
A nonmember Indian seeking to challenge the Duro-fix on equal
protection grounds faces a difficult line of precedents that have estab-
lished this minimal level of judicial scrutiny. Although equal protec-
tion limitations likely apply to the Duro-fix, the distinction between
(nonmember) Indians and (nonmember) non-Indians would consti-
tute a political and not a race-based distinction. Strict scrutiny would
therefore not apply, and a traditional rational basis or modified Man-
cari rationally-based-in-accordance-with-federal-obligations test would
apply. As the purpose of the Duro-fix was to extend tribal jurisdic-
tion-an expansion of tribal sovereignty taken in accordance with the
trust relationship-the Duro-fix would likely meet the requirements of
either rationality test. Unless the Court is willing to reconsider its po-
litical classification of Indians, the Duro-fix is not vulnerable to an
equal protection claim.
B. Due Process Violation
Congress passed the Duro-fix to restore the inherent sovereignty
that was stripped from tribes by the Supreme Court. Because of this
affirmative congressional action, nonmember Indians are subject to
criminal prosecution by tribes. The protections available to non-
member Indians facing criminal prosecution include only those lim-
96 See Morton, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24 ("The preference is not directed towards a 'racial' group
consisting of 'Indians'... the preference is political rather than racial in nature.").
97 See Williams, supra note 92, at 788 ("[I]f the federal government deals with the tribes as
political units, then the law presents no suspect classification").
98 Morton, 417 U.S. at 555.
99 See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977) ("[Federal regulation... is not
based upon impermissible classifications. Rather, such regulation is rooted in the unique status
of Indians as 'a separate people' with their own political institutions."); Fisherv. Dist. Court, 424
U.S. 382, 391 (1976) ("[S]uch disparate treatment of the Indian is justified because it is in-
tended to benefit the class of which he is a member by furthering the congressional policy of
Indian self-government.").
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ited guarantees provided by Congress in the ICRA and any additional
tribal constitutional or statutory provisions. The due process issue
that arises is whether Congress may subject American citizens (non-
member Indians) to a judicial system that provides fewer due process
protections then are required by the Constitution even though Con-
gress has the authority to define the exact individual protections
available to defendants in that court. More specifically, is Congress's
failure to provide a right to counsel in ICRA to nonmember Indians
in tribal court a violation of a nonmember Indian's due process rights
under the Constitution? Although the Court has hinted otherwise,
the answer to this question should be no, as no viable due process
claim exists under the current landscape of federal law.
Before endeavoring to answer this question, it should be noted
why this analysis is limited to nonmember Indians: in other words,
why does an Indian who is prosecuted by his own tribe not have the
same footing for this claim as an Indian prosecuted by a tribe in
which he or she is not a member? The Supreme Court has declared
that it is "undisputed"'' 0 that tribes have criminal jurisdiction over
their own members.'0 ' The Court has concluded that Indians, as "a
separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and so-
cial relations,"0 2 retain the right to "prescribe laws applicable to tribe
members and to enforce those laws by criminal sanctions."' °3 The
Court has shown a greater willingness to accept tribal actions that
regulate the tribe's own people than those that affect nonmembers.
0 4
The sure footing of tribal jurisdiction over tribal members is rooted
in the ability of members to shape the content of tribal law and its
protections through the political process.' °5 This same footing is ab-
sent for (Indian and non-Indian) nonmembers who, as political out-
siders, have no internal avenue to address and define the scope of
rights provided by the tribal authority. The inability of nonmember
Indians to establish and change tribal law through the political proc-
ess places nonmember Indians in a stronger position to assert a due
process argument than member Indians whose prosecution repre-
sents the "regulat[ion of] ... internal and social relations."'
0 6
100 See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) ("It is undisputed that Indian tribes
have power to enforce their criminal laws against tribe members.").
101 See id.
102 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886).
103 Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322.
104 See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990) ("We hold that the retained sovereignty of the
tribe as a political and social organization to govern its own affairs does not include the author-
ity to impose criminal sanctions against a citizen outside its own membership.").
105 See Duro, 495 U.S. at 694 ("Retained criminal jurisdiction over members is accepted by our
precedents and justified by the voluntary character of tribal membership and the concomitant
fight of participation in a tribal government, the authority of which rests on consent.").
106 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 382.
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In Duro, the court noted that the lack of complete due process
protections available to nonmember Indians in tribal court might
107represent a due process violation. However, the Court did not con-
clude whether the prosecution violated Duro's due process rights.
The Court, in suggesting the existence of a due process problem in
Duro, referenced only one case, Reid v. Covert,'0 s to support this propo-
sition. 1°9 In Reid, the Court was reviewing the military trial of a ser-
viceman's spouse." ° Ms. Covert was tried and convicted by a military
court-martial for killing her husband, a sergeant in the Air Force, on
a military base abroad. In her military prosecution, Ms. Covert was
not provided the full scope of due process rights afforded to an indi-
vidual in civil courts; most notably, she was not given the opportunity
to have her case heard by a jury.
The Court framed the significant principle to be decided in Reid
as the determination of whether it is within "the power of Congress to
expose civilians to trial by military tribunals.. . with [out] all the safe-
guards of the Bill of Rights."' The Court has regularly held that
Congress may authorize prosecutions of members of the military un-
der the lesser protections provided by military courts.12 In Reid, the
Court asked whether an American citizen who is not a member of the
military may similarly be subjected to military prosecution in peace-
time. The Reid Court held that American citizens not serving in the
military who are tried abroad by United States military officials in
peacetime are entitled to Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections.
1 1 3
The Court concluded in Reid that, "[w] hen the Government reaches
out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of
Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life
107 See Duro, 495 U.S. at 693 ("Our cases suggest constitutional limitations... on the ability of
Congress to subject American citizens to criminal proceedings before a tribunal that does not
provide constitutional protections as a matter of right.").
108 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
109 The Court asserts that cases, plural, align with this conclusion, but only explicitly supports
this point by referencing a single case, Reid. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 693.
110 See Reid, 354 U.S. at 3 (describing how Mrs. Covert, who was not military personnel, killed
her husband, a sergeant in the United States Air Force, on a base in England and explaining
that she was tried and convicted by court-martial for murder).
III Id.
112 See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 240-41 (1960) ("The test for
jurisdiction ... is one of status, namely, whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding is a
person who can be regarded as falling within the term 'land and naval Forces.'") (emphasis in
original); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 439 (1987) ("In an unbroken line of decisions
from 1866 to 1960, this Court interpreted the Constitution as conditioning the proper exercise
of court-martial jurisdiction over an offense on one factor: the military status of the accused.").
113 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 263 (1990) (noting how the District
Court cited to Reid for the proposition that "American citizens tried by United States military
authorities in a foreign country were entitled to the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments," and concluded that "'[t]he Constitution imposes substantive constraints on the federal
government, even when it operates abroad.'").
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and liberty should not be stripped away ... ."' In spite of the sweep-
ing generality of this language, it should be noted that the Court
holding is limited to non-military citizens and is not disallowing such
"stripping" in trials of military personnel.
The Reid decision provides a ready, but as we will see, flawed anal-
ogy to a nonmember Indian seeking to overturn his tribal court trial
conviction on due process grounds. A nonmember Indian may
analogize himself to Ms. Covert, as he too, an American citizen," has
been subjected to punishment without the complete protections of
the Bill of Rights. A nonmember Indian may have an even more
compelling case than Ms. Covert as his conviction occurred within
the boundaries of the United States, a seemingly more outrageous
venue in which to be denied the constitutional protections than a
trial occurring on a military base an ocean away.
Under its Article I power "to make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces,""6 Congress has wide lati-
tude to determine the procedure and protections available to military
personnel tried by military tribunals.' However, when the military
deals with civilians, as in the case of Ms. Covert, the Court has been
chary of extending the same discretion. The resulting status-based
jurisdictional rules for military trials provide a convenient model for
determining the extent of protections available in tribal courts.
Through analogy, tribal members, similar to military personnel sub-
ject to lesser protections in military proceedings, may face the less
encumbered powers of the tribe; as military personnel lose the bene-
fit of these protections by entering the military, so too does an Indian
joining his tribe. In contrast, nonmembers should be entitled to full
protections in tribal actions in the same way civilians facing prosecu-
tion in peacetime military tribunals are ensured their full rights. Nei-
ther nonmembers nor non-servicemen have voided their full rights
through membership, and thus both should be entitled to the full
protections of the Bill of Rights.
114 Reid, 354 U.S. at 6.
11 That he is an American citizen is important to this analysis. For example, see Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270, where the Court specifically noted that Reids holding does not apply
to non-citizens. ("Since respondent is not a United States citizen, he can derive no comfort
from the Reid holding.").
116 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
17 See Solorio, 483 U.S. at 439 (noting the Constitution's conferral of congressional authority
to regulate the land and naval forces, thus enabling Congress to try servicemembers via court-
martial). The Constitution grants to Congress the power "[t]o make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. Exercising this au-
thority, Congress has empowered courts-martial to try servicemen for the crimes proscribed by
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
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The Court in Reid was wary of government attempts to restrict the
applicability of the protections of the Bill of Rights for reasons of
convenience:
The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections
against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become incon-
venient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doc-
trine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written
Constitution and undermine the basis of our Government."s
An inconvenience-based rationale for providing incomplete protec-
tions was the entire reasoning behind Congress's decision to pass the
ICRA without a right to counsel provision. Congress left out this pro-
tection because it believed that the provision of counsel would be too
costly for limited tribal budgets (many of which rely heavily on fed-
eral financial support), and because many reservations were not geo-
graphically near a pool of attorneys that could provide legal services
to all indigent clients. The decision to limit protections in the ICRA
relies on arguments of financial convenience, the exact underpin-
nings that Reid worried would "undermine" our government.
The surface parallels that suggest a status-based tribal court theory
might appropriately mirror a status-based military court theory do not
hold up upon deeper examination of the sources of these two au-
thorities. In military tribunals, citizens and military personnel are
treated differently because the source for such prosecutions origi-
nates in Congress's constitutional authority to regulate "land and na-
val forces." Only prosecutions that can be justified under this objec-
tive are permitted, and, as prosecuting civilians in peacetime does not
fall within this power, citizen civilians may not be subjected to military
prosecutions. However, unlike military trials, tribal court actions
are not authorized, and thus, limited, by the Constitution. As was re-
inforced in Lara, tribes prosecute nonmembers and members under
the authority of the tribe's own sovereignty. In Lara, the Court made
clear that the source of authority for tribal prosecutions does not
originate from a federal delegation of power, but instead stems from
the inherent retained sovereignty of the tribe. Because the source of
authority is tribal sovereignty, a (United States) court has no constitu-
tional handle akin to the "land and naval forces" provision with which
to probe for federal government action that has gone beyond feder-
ally provided constitutional authority. There simply can be no inter-
pretation that the federal government has exceeded its textually
granted power, as was the Court's conclusion in Reid, where the fed-
Il Reid, 354 U.S. at 14.
19 See id. at 35 ("As this Court [has] stated ... the business of soldiers is to fight and prepare
to fight wars, not to try civilians for their alleged crimes.") (citing United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955)).
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eral government is not the sovereign actor in question. Thus, any at-
tempt to analogize tribal nonmembers to military nonmembers falls
flat because the source of authority and limitations for federal mili-
tary judicial action is constitutional while the source for tribal judicial
actions is the extra-constitutional authority of a tribal sovereign.
The simple showing that there has been an incomplete provision
of constitutional protections, therefore, does not complete the anal-
ogy. In Reid, the Court was reviewing a trial pursued under federal
authorities bound by the Constitution. In Lara, the Court made clear
that the authority for tribal prosecution was not federal power, but
tribal sovereignty. After Lara, asserting that the punisher in a tribal
case is the federal government becomes exceedingly difficult. A chal-
lenger may attempt to draw scrutiny to the missing protections in the
ICRA by suggesting that the entanglement exception to the state ac-
tion doctrine could apply to tribal actions, but this argument seems
too great a stretch considering the tribal source of authority is tribal
sovereignty. 20 An individual may also seek to persuade the Court that
the broader principle behind Reid-Congress should avoiding plac-
ing citizens in the line of prosecution lacking full constitutional pro-
tections-carries more weight than the technical differences between
military and tribal courts.
V. IMPORTANCE OFJURISDICTION TO EFFECTIVE TRIBAL GOVERNANCE
The inclusion of nonmember Indians within tribal jurisdiction is
not only Constitutional, but is also important for effective tribal gov-
ernance. Indians of various tribal memberships often participate in
the social structure of an individual reservation. 121 The existence of
intertribal social events, including intertribal rodeos 1 2 and pow-
120 The state action doctrine requires (state or federal) government action to trigger Four-
teenth Amendment concerns. The Court has developed a number of exceptions, including the
"entanglement" exception, which allows for the extension of the Fourteenth Amendment
where the government is entangled with private entities through subsidies, licensing, and regu-
lation, among others. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 478-86 (discussing the evolu-
tion of incorporation). Applying the entanglement application in this case would depend upon
an argument that the federal government is so intertwined in the regulation of tribal govern-
ment, both structurally and financially, that tribes' actions and due process violations can be
superimposed on the federal government. The federal government would, therefore, be re-
sponsible for the violations, and would be required to fix (likely by amending the ICRA to in-
clude the full degree of Bill or Rights protections) the violation. However, as the source of au-
thority for tribal action has been so explicitly defined as originating from a sovereign distinct
from the federal government, a court would have to extend the entanglement doctrine from
individuals to sovereigns, a seemingly unlikely application of the exception.
121 See infra notes 122-24 (describing intertribal events).
122 All-Indian rodeos occur on and off reservations in Arizona, Montana, Colorado, Florida,
and other states. See, e.g., Indian Rodeo News, www.indianrodeonews.com (last visited Jan. 5,
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wows, 2 3 creates a fluid movement of Indians through different re-
gions and reservations. The mobility of tribal members and preva-
lence of intertribal social events have led to tribal intermarriage,
multi-tribal children, and nonmember Indian reservation residency.
2
1
With the fluidity of movement and marriage, some reservations may
find a significant minority of its residents and visitors are Indians with
an ancestral background different than that of the governing tribe. 
2
5
As a result of the regular involvement of nonmember Indians in
tribal activities and communities, these cross-reservation Indians are
"far more integrated into an American-Indian community than tour-
ists in a foreign land."
26
Tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is therefore impor-
tant to ensure effective tribal self-determination. 2 1 Without jurisdic-
tion, tribes would lack authority to regulate and hold accountable a
minority population that regularly participates, typically properly, but
occasionally improperly, in tribal life. Because this justification for
jurisdiction presumes a need based on the likelihood of future tribal
prosecutions of nonmember Indians, nonmember Indians will cer-
tainly be placed within the acting powers of tribal courts. The regular
exertion of tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians should trig-
ger concern for the level of respect for civil rights afforded to these
2005) (listing Indian rodeo events and providing an online dating service, "The Hitch," a ser-
vice likely to facilitate the creation of intertribal relationships).
123 See, e.g., Gathering of Nations, www.gatheringofnations.com (last visited Jan. 5, 2005) (de-
scribing an annual pow-wow in New Mexico that involves 3000 dancers from more than 500
tribes).
124 See, e.g., Karen Ivanova, The Tapestry of Indian Ancesty: Data Offers First Look at Diversity of
Native American Lineage, GREAT FALLS TRIBUNE ONLINE, available at http://
www.greatfallstribune.com/communities/census2000/20010708/754973.html ("Carol Juneau
can count a lot of nations on her family tree. A state representative from the Blackfeet Indian
Reservation, Juneau is half Hidatsa-Mandan and half Norwegian. Her husband, Stan, is mostly
Blackfeet, but also claims Tlingit-Haida blood from Alaska, Oneida blood from Wisconsin and
French and English ancestry.").
125 See, e.g., id. (describing Rosebud County, Montana, site of a portion of the Northern Chey-
enne Reservation, as including "113 Sioux, 8 Apache, 21 Blackfeet, 18 Chippewa and 12 Navajo"
among its population).
126 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Affirmation of Tribal Jurisdiction Over Nonmember American Indians:
United States v. Lara, MICH. BARJ.,July 2004, at 24, 25.
127 That the involvement of nonmember Indians in social relationships and reservation life is
typically greater than that of nonmember non-Indians presents a possible logical justification
for Congress's decision to extend tribal jurisdiction to nonmember Indians without making a
similar "Oliphant-fix" for non-Indians. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685-87 (1989) (describ-
ing the distinction between members and nonmembers in terms of self-governance and internal
relations); see also infra note 34 (citing the "Duro-fix" legislation). Congress's decision may re-
flect a belief that tribes have a greatest need to regulate and manage those who have large roles
in tribal society, and thus tribes should be permitted jurisdiction over more commonly inte-
grated nonmember Indians, There are other possible justifications for drawing the jurisdiction
line at the Indian/non-Indian, rather than member/nonmember or the presence of sufficient
contacts, but this seems the most logical.
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individuals by tribal governments; any assertion of government power
should make individuals, especially those excluded from voting in
that political system, wary of the possible application of unfair proce-
dural or substantive laws that fail to acknowledge individual liber-
ties. 28 However, considering the enforceability of a fairly compre-
hensive set of protections in the ICRA in federal and tribal court, and
the continuing development of tribal governments, this issue pro-
vides less ground for concern than one might imagine upon first
blush. Tribes, as opposed to the federal government, are also in the
best position to regulate and prosecute those individuals who, when
interacting with the reservation community, commit on-reservation
crimes. The expansion of tribal authority to independently govern
should outweigh civil rights concerns, or at least suggest the best way
to ensure these rights is to work cooperatively with tribal govern-
ments rather than to terminate their jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
A nonmember Indian seeking to invalidate a tribal conviction on
the grounds of a violation of due process or equal protection rights
faces a number of challenges. An individual who overcomes the lo-
gistical difficulties of securing counsel and capturing the short win-
dow of availability for a habeas petition succeeds only in gaining the
opportunity to bring a claim opposed by a series of Supreme Court
precedents that unfavorably: (1) interpret the ICRA, (2) define
equal protection jurisprudence for Indians, and (3) exempt Indian
sovereigns from the application of the Bill of Rights. A nonmember
Indian would, therefore, require one of the following changes in law
to be successful: the Court would have to establish a new interpreta-
tion of the ICRA to apply its due process clause in a manner repeat-
edly disavowed in federal court opinions and legislative history; the
Supreme Court would have to set aside its decision in Mancari or per-
form an extremely strained rational basis analysis to create an equal
protection violation; or, the Court would have to eviscerate (but not
overturn) the long standing doctrine developed in Talton by requir-
ing Bill of Rights protections be applied to tribal governments when
trying nonmembers.
Although none of these arguments have strong support in current
interpretations and precedent, the Supreme Court has indicated its
interest in hearing this case (in Lara), and suggested (in Duro) that
128 This wariness does not originate from any specific concerns as to Indian governments. All
governments have the potential to abuse their power. Individuals and advocates for humans
rights and civil liberties protections should be watchful of how all governments, including those
managed by tribes, use their police and prosecutorial powers.
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such actions against nonmember American citizens may be constitu-
tionally impermissible. The Court's interest in this case suggests it
may view a nonmember Indian's arguments in a more favorable light
and/or may be willing to dispense with (or distinguish from) previ-
ous precedent to reach that result. The Court's easiest avenue to
strengthen the due process requirements in tribal courts while avoid-
ing constitutional questions is to interpret the ICRA due process
clause to include a right to counsel. If the Court is instead interested
in reexamining the constitutional underpinnings of Indian law, the
Court may be willing to revisit Talton and apply Bill of Rights protec-
tions to tribes. The outcome of this currently hypothetical, but likely
real, future case therefore may swing less on the state of present law
and more on the interest of the Justices in redefining the limits on
tribal sovereignty.
